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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In Alden v. Maine2 the Supreme Court considered whether Congress, pursuant to 
its Article I powers, can subject a nonconsenting state to a private suit for damages in 
the state’s own courts.  Alternatively viewed, the question was whether a state has 
sovereign immunity which precludes such suits.  The petitioners were employees of 
the State of Maine who sought monetary damages from the State for violations of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA),3 which specifically authorized such a suit.  
The Maine courts had dismissed the suit on sovereign immunity grounds. 
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Article I of the Constitution does not 
grant Congress the power to subject a nonconsenting state to a private suit for 
damages in the state's own courts.4  The Court explained that state immunity to 
private suits “neither derives from nor is limited by the terms of the Eleventh 
                                                                
1B.S., University of Florida; J.D., summa cum laude, Michigan State University – Detroit 
College of Law, 2001.  I would like to thank Professor Susan H. Bitensky of Michigan State 
University – Detroit College of Law for her insightful criticism and advice throughout the 
development of this article. 
2527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
329 U.S.C. §§ 201-207 (1994). 
4See Alden, 527 U.S. at 712. 
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Amendment.”5  Rather, such immunity “is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty 
which the States enjoyed” prior to entering the federal system.6  The states retain this 
immunity “except as altered by the plan of the [Constitutional] Convention or certain 
constitutional amendments.”7  This is implicit in the federal structure and confirmed 
by the Tenth Amendment.8  The decision represents a direct extension of the 
federalism developed by the Court in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,9 and is 
philosophically consistent with other recent “states rights” cases such as New York v. 
United States,10 and Printz v. United States.11 
This note will review the history of state sovereign immunity and congressional 
power to subject states to lawsuits.  Next, this note will examine the holdings and 
opinions in Alden.  Finally, the underlying basis for the Alden decision will be 
analyzed. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Alden v. Maine12 represents the most recent major development in a long-running 
debate about the nature and extent of state sovereign immunity under the 
Constitution.  Article III of the Constitution provides that “the judicial Power [of the 
United States] shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority . . . [and] to Controversies . . . between a State and 
Citizens of another State.”13  It provides further that “In all Cases . . . in which a 
State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.”14  By its 
text then, Article III taken alone appears to confer both federal question and diversity 
jurisdiction on the federal courts when a state is a party to a suit.  The meaning of 
this text and its relationship to congressional powers granted elsewhere in the 
Constitution are at the heart of the sovereign immunity debate. 
Disagreement about state sovereign immunity dates back to the pre-ratification 
period.  At that time, many states were saddled with Revolutionary War debt and 
were thus “vitally interested” in whether, under Article III, they would be subject to 
federal court suits on these debts.15  Consequently, the ratification debates addressed 
                                                                
5Id. at 713. 
6Id. 
7Id. 
8See id. at 713-14. 
9517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
10505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
11521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
12527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
13U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
14U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
15See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 418 (1979). 
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the state sovereign immunity question primarily within the context of this potential 
debt enforcement.16  
Alexander Hamilton, in The Federalist No. 81, considered whether, under Article 
III, “an assignment of the public securities of one State to the citizens of another, 
would enable them to prosecute that State in the federal courts.”17  His position was 
that: 
[I]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit 
of an individual without its consent . . . . Unless, therefore, there is a 
surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain 
with the States and the danger intimated must be merely ideal.18  
Although Hamilton was “plainly talking about a suit subject to a federal court’s 
jurisdiction under the Citizen-State Diversity Clauses of Article III,”19 he did not 
specifically reconcile the apparent conflict between his position and Article III’s 
diversity jurisdiction language.  In supporting and expanding on Hamilton’s theme at 
the Virginia ratifying convention, however, James Madison suggested that the 
purpose of the citizen-state diversity jurisdiction clause was to provide for federal 
jurisdiction only when a state was a plaintiff, not a defendant, or when a state 
otherwise consented to suit.20  John Marshall, speaking after Madison at the Virginia 
convention, likewise argued that the clause was only intended to cover suits in which 
a state was the plaintiff.21 
Disputing the views of Madison and Marshall in favor of the plain meaning of 
the text of Article III, Edmund Randolph argued that “any doubt respecting the 
construction that a state may be a plaintiff, and not defendant, is taken away by the 
words where a state shall be a party.”22  Similarly, James Wilson expressed a strong 
anti-immunity position at the Pennsylvania Convention, arguing that the concept of 
impartiality inherent in the Constitution requires a federal forum in which individuals 
and states receive equal treatment.23  Wilson's view was “that the sovereignty resides 
in the people; they have not parted with it; they have only dispensed such portions of 
the power as were conceived necessary for the public welfare.”24 
                                                                
16See Alden, 527 U.S. at 772-73 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
17THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 125 (Alexander Hamilton) (M. Walter Dunne ed. 1901). 
18Id. at 125-26. 
19Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 144-45 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
20See 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533 (2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES]; Alden, 527 U.S. at 718 (citing 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 533); Alden, 527 U.S. 
at 776 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 533). 
21See 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 555; Alden, 527 U.S. at 718 (citing 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 555); 
Alden, 527 U.S. at 776 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 555).  
22Alden, 527 U.S. at 776 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 573). 
23See id. at 777 (citing 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 491). 
24Id. (citing 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 443). 
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The ratification debates did not resolve the issue.25  Consequently, to hedge their 
positions, some states in their formal ratification documents issued declarations or 
proposed amendments which specifically provided for some form of state immunity 
in federal court.26  The New York and Rhode Island Conventions declared that “the 
judicial power of the United States, in cases in which a state may be a party, does not 
extend to criminal prosecutions, or to authorize any suit by any person against a 
state.”27  The Rhode Island Convention went on to propose that  
[t]o remove all doubts or controversies respecting the same, . . . it be 
especially expressed, as a part of the Constitution of the United States, 
that Congress shall not, directly or indirectly, either by themselves or 
through the judiciary, interfere with any one of the states . . . in liquidating 
and discharging the public securities of any one state.28  
The Virginia and North Carolina conventions proposed amendments which would 
have entirely eliminated the diversity jurisdiction language in Article III.29 
Despite this early disagreement, Article III was ratified with the disputed 
jurisdictional provisions intact.30  Two years later, the Judiciary Act of 1789 
incorporated this language in its grant of authority to the Supreme Court, providing:  
[T]he Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies 
of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state and its 
citizens; and except also between a state and citizens of other states and 
aliens, in which latter case it shall have original but not exclusive 
jurisdiction.31 
The meaning of the diversity jurisdiction language in Article III and the Judiciary 
Act went untested for five years32 until the case of Chisholm v. Georgia33 reached the 
United States Supreme Court. 
In Chisholm, the question was presented in the form of a motion to compel an 
appearance by the State of Georgia, on danger of default, in a common law 
assumpsit action brought in federal court against the State by Chisholm, a citizen of 
                                                                
25See id. at 778. 
26See id. at 718, 778-79 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
27Alden, 527 U.S. at 778-79 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 329, 336). 
28Id. at 779-80 (citing 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 336). 
29See id. at 724-25, 780 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
30See id. at 778 n.18 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
31Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 80 (1789). 
32In an earlier case, Van Stophorst v. Maryland, 2 U.S. 401 (1791),  the State of Maryland 
was sued by a foreign citizen for debts owed by the state.  Maryland submitted to process and 
subsequently settled the case rather than risking an adverse ruling on immunity.  See Alden, 
527 U.S. at 789 n.25 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
332 U.S. 419 (1793). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss3/6
2000] ALDEN v. MAINE AND STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 507 
South Carolina, to collect on a Revolutionary War debt.34  The Governor and 
Attorney General of Georgia had been served with notice,35 but the state “refuse[d] to 
appear and answer. . . [arguing] she [was] a sovereign State and therefore not liable 
to such actions.”36  The Court rejected this immunity defense and granted the motion 
in what was effectively a four-to-one majority decision.37  The four concurring 
Justices, in individual opinions, essentially found that the Constitution meant what it 
said.  They all found a clear authorization for citizen-state diversity jurisdiction in 
the text of Article III.38  Each rejected a construction of this text which would allow a 
grant of jurisdiction only when a state was a plaintiff and not a defendant.39  
Additionally, at least two of the concurring Justices believed that the concept of state 
sovereign immunity advanced by Georgia was inconsistent with the principle of 
popular sovereignty on which the Constitution was based.40 
Justice Iredell, the lone dissenter, argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction.  
However, his argument was not based on a theory of constitutional state sovereign 
immunity, but rather, on the grounds that Congress had not conferred jurisdiction on 
the federal courts over unconsenting states.  He noted that although the Judiciary Act 
provided for original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over all civil controversies 
“between a State and citizens of another State”41 it went on to provide that any writs 
issued by the federal courts not specifically provided for by statute must be 
“agreeable to the principles and usages of law.”42  Justice Iredell interpreted this 
latter language as directing the Court to issue non-statutory writs only in accordance 
with the law of a particular state or “[p]rinciples of law common to all the States” 
                                                                
34See id. at 419-20. See also, Atascadero v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 281 (1985) (“Chisholm 
was an action in assumpsit by a citizen of South Carolina for the price of military goods sold 
to Georgia in 1777."). 
35See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 419. 
36Id. at 469. 
37See id. at 479. 
38See, e.g., id. at 466 (Justice Wilson concurring) (“[W]e may safely conclude . . . that the 
State of Georgia is amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court . . . . [T]his doctrine . . . is 
confirmed, beyond all doubt, by the direct and explicit declaration of the Constitution itself.”). 
39See, e.g., id. at 476 (Jay, C.J., concurring)  
If the Constitution really meant to extend these powers only to those controversies in 
which a State might be a Plaintiff, to the exclusion of those in which citizens had 
demands against a State, it is inconceivable that it should have attempted to convey 
that meaning in words, not only so incompetent, but also repugnant to it.  
40See, e.g., Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 470-71 (Jay, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he people exercised 
. . . their own proper sovereignty. . . establishing a Constitution by which it was their will, that 
the State Governments should be bound, and to which the State Constitutions should be made 
to conform.”); id. at 454 (Wilson, J. concurring) (“To the Constitution of the United States the 
term SOVEREIGN, is totally unknown.  There is but one place it could have been used with 
propriety. . . . [The framers] might have announced themselves ‘SOVEREIGN’ people of the 
United States . . .”). 
41Id. at 431 (Iredell, J., dissenting). 
42Id. at 434. 
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derived from the common law.43  Believing that no state authorized compulsory suits 
for damages against itself, and that state sovereign immunity was a part of the 
existing common law, Justice Iredell argued that any contrary holding by the 
Supreme Court would violate the terms of the Judiciary Act.44  Because he based his 
dissent on the terms of the Judiciary Act, Justice Iredell specifically reserved 
judgment on the question of whether Congress had the power to abrogate this 
common law immunity.45 
The Chisholm decision proved immediately controversial as it directly affected 
the ability of the states to revoke their war debts.46  In response, “the proposal 
adopted as the Eleventh Amendment was introduced in the Senate” soon 
afterwards.47  This proposal received prompt attention and “little more than two 
months after its introduction it had been endorsed by both Houses and forwarded to 
the States”48 which adopted the Amendment.  
The Eleventh Amendment provides that “[t]he Judicial power of the United 
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by 
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”49  By its text, which closely tracks 
language in Article III, the Amendment appears to be specifically directed toward 
eliminating federal citizen-state diversity jurisdiction.50  Whether the Eleventh 
                                                                
43Id. 
44See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 436-37. 
45Id. at 449.  
But it is of extreme moment that no Judge should rashly commit himself upon 
important questions, which it is unnecessary for him to decide.  My opinion being, that 
even if the Constitution would admit of the exercise of such a power, a new law is 
necessary for the purpose since no part of the existing law applies, this alone is 
sufficient to justify my determination in the present case. 
Id. 
46See, e.g. Alden, 527 U.S. at 720 (“The States, in particular, responded with outrage to the 
decision.”).  
47Id. at 721 (A constitutional amendment which would have granted the states extensive 
immunity in federal court had been immediately proposed in the House of Representatives but 
was not acted on.)  See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 111 (citing GAZETTE OF THE UNITED 
STATES 303 (Feb. 20, 1793)).  (Souter, J., dissenting).  The amendment, proposed by Theodore 
Sedgewick of Massachusetts provided that, 
[N]o state shall be liable to be made a party defendant, in any of the judicial courts, 
established, or which shall be established under the authority of the United States, at 
the suit of any person or persons, whether a citizen or citizens, or a foreigner or 
foreigners, or of any body politic or corporate, whether within or without the United 
States. 
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 111. 
48Alden, 527 U.S. at 721. 
49U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
50See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (“the text of the Amendment would appear to 
restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts.”). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss3/6
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Amendment had implications for state sovereign immunity beyond this textual 
construction of its terms was the subject of Hans v. Louisiana.51 
Hans, like Chisholm, was a federal court suit brought by an individual in federal 
court against a state to compel payment on the state’s debt obligations.52  The State 
of Louisiana had issued coupon bearing bonds in 1874 and concurrently amended its 
constitution to declare that the bonds created a valid contract by the state.53  In 1879, 
the state adopted a new constitution which superseded the previous constitution and 
provided that interest on the 1874 bonds falling due on January 1, 1880 would be 
defrayed to meet other state expenses.54  Hans, a citizen of Louisiana, held bond 
coupons affected by this provision and sued the state in federal court for $87,500 
plus accrued interest.55  He alleged an impairment of a valid contract by the state in 
violation of Article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution.56  Louisiana 
contended it had sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and the trial 
court dismissed the suit on that basis.57 
Whereas Chisholm involved a state law claim brought against Georgia by a 
citizen of another state, Hans involved a federal constitutional claim brought against 
Louisiana by one of its own citizens.  Hans thus presented the Court with two 
distinct questions.  Hans first contended that the Eleventh Amendment by its terms 
barred only diversity jurisdiction in federal courts and had no application when a 
federal question was being contested.58  He noted that Article III extends federal 
judicial power to “all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution” with no 
qualification as to the character of the parties.59  Consequently, Hans contended that 
“a state can claim no exemption from suit, if the case is really one arising under the 
Constitution.”60 
The Court rejected this limited reading of the Eleventh Amendment, citing as 
precedent the cases of Louisiana v. Jumel,61 Hagood v. Southern,62 and In re Ayers.63  
Those cases involved similar constitutional claims brought against states by citizens 
of other states.  The Court summarized these precedents by stating “[i]t was not 
                                                                
51134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
52See Hans, 134 U.S. at 1. 
53See id. at 2. 
54See id. at 2-3. 
55See id. at 3. 
56Id. (The Constitution provides that “No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.). 
57See Hans, 134 U.S. at 3-4. 
58See id. at 9. 
59Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.). 
60Id. 
61107 U.S. 711 (1883). 
62117 U.S. 52 (1886). 
63123 U.S. 443 (1887). 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
510 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:503 
denied that they presented cases arising under the Constitution [rather than diversity 
jurisdiction alone]; but, notwithstanding that, they were held to be prohibited by the 
[Eleventh Amendment].”64 
This position gave rise to Hans’ second argument which was that even if the 
Eleventh Amendment applied to federal question jurisdiction, it did not serve to bar 
his suit because the “amendment only prohibits suits against a state which are 
brought by the citizens of another state.”65  The Court conceded “[i]t is true the 
amendment does so read,”66 but rejected the argument nonetheless.  On this point, 
the Court initially noted that because it had extended Eleventh Amendment 
immunity to federal question suits, if Hans’ argument was upheld, it would produce 
the “anomalous result” that in such cases, “a state may be sued in the federal courts 
by its own citizens, though it cannot be sued for a like cause of action by the citizens 
of other states.”67  However, the Court primarily supported its decision with the 
broader argument that the states entered the Union with sovereign immunity and that 
this immunity had not been abrogated by the Constitution.68  
To support this broader argument, the Court drew on the positions taken by 
Hamilton, Madison and Marshall during the ratification debates,69 and Justice 
Iredell's dissent in Chisholm.  The Court characterized the Chisholm decision as an 
overly textual misconstruction of Article III which was inconsistent with the 
underlying principle of state sovereign immunity.70  It viewed the Eleventh 
Amendment as an overruling of the Supreme Court on this point.  Thus, in the 
Court’s view, the Eleventh Amendment did not establish or define the limits of state 
sovereign immunity; rather, because it specifically reversed the Chisholm decision, 
the Court understood the Amendment to confirm the existence of a broader 
immunity.71  
The rationale behind Hans, that the principle of state sovereign immunity in 
federal court was not specifically limited by the precise text of the Eleventh 
Amendment, was expanded in subsequent cases.72  In Smith v. Reeves73 the Court 
                                                                
64Hans, 134 U.S. at 10. 
65Id. 
66Id. 
67Id. 
68See id. at 16. (“The suability of a state, without its consent, was a thing unknown to the 
law.”). 
69See supra text accompanying notes 17-21. 
70See Hans, 134 U.S. at 12.  
The [concurring] justices were more swayed by a close observance of the letter of the 
constitution, without regard to former experience and usage; and because the letter 
said that the judicial power shall extend to controversies 'between a state and citizens 
of another state;' and 'between a state and foreign states, citizens or subjects,' they felt 
constrained to see in this language a power to enable the individual citizens of one 
state, of a foreign state, to sue another state of the Union in the federal courts. 
71See id. at 11-12. 
72See Alden, 527 U.S. at 728. 
73178 U.S. 436 (1900). 
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held that sovereign immunity barred federal court suits against states brought by 
federal corporations.74  In Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi,75 the Court held that 
states were similarly immune to suits brought by foreign states.76  In Blatchford v. 
Native Village of Noatak,77 the Court relied on Monaco to further extend the states’ 
federal court immunity to cover suits brought by Indian Tribes,78 and, in In re New 
York,79 the Court held that state sovereign immunity extends to suits in admiralty 
even though “the [Eleventh] Amendment speaks only of suits in law or equity.”80  
While the cases in the Hans line espoused the principle of a broad state sovereign 
immunity, the cases, like Justice Iredell’s Chisholm dissent, still did not squarely 
address the question of whether Congress has the power to abrogate this immunity.81  
In the federal court context, that question was addressed and initially answered in the 
affirmative in two key cases. 
The first, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,82 involved a suit filed in federal district court by 
employees of the State of Connecticut against various officials of that state.83  The 
employees alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.84  In 1972, pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,85 Congress 
had amended Title VII to specifically authorize private suits of this type.86  The 
district court granted the plaintiffs a prospective injunction but denied money 
                                                                
74See Reeves, 178 U.S. at 449. 
75292 U.S. 313 (1934). 
76See Monaco, 292 U.S. at 330-31. 
77501 U.S. 775 (1991). 
78See Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 780-82. 
79256 U.S. 490 (1921). 
80New York, 256 U.S. at 497.  Further refinements of the Hans doctrine were provided by 
the cases of Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), and Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. 
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).  In Hall, the State of Nevada was named a defendant in a 
civil suit brought in a California state court.  The California Supreme Court held that the trial 
court had proper jurisdiction and following a trial, judgment was entered against Nevada.  See 
Hall, 440 U.S. at 411-12.  The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a state’s 
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment does not extend to suits brought in the 
courts of another state.  See id. at 426-27.  More recently, in Pennhurst, the Court held that a 
state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity bars a federal court, in an exercise of pendent 
jurisdiction, from enforcing a state’s own laws against officials of that state when the state 
itself is the real party in interest.  See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 121. 
81See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68 (1996).  (“It is true that we 
have not had occasion previously to apply established Eleventh Amendment principles to the 
question whether Congress has the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity . . .”). 
82427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
83See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 457 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
84See id. at 448. 
85Section 5 grants Congress the “power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5. 
86See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 448-49. 
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damages on state sovereign immunity grounds.87  The Court of Appeals affirmed on 
this point.88  The question presented to the Supreme Court was whether “Congress 
ha[d] the power to authorize federal courts to enter . . . [an award of money damages 
to a private individual] against [a] state as a means of enforcing the substantive 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment" or whether such power was precluded by 
the “shield of sovereign immunity afforded the State by the Eleventh Amendment.”89 
The Bitzer majority, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, acknowledged the 
principle of state sovereign immunity set forth in Hans, but held that this otherwise 
effective immunity was specifically limited by the authority granted to Congress by 
the Fourteenth Amendment.90  As explained by the Court, the Civil War 
Amendments represented a “shift in the federal-state balance” and granted Congress 
the power to intrude into the states’ spheres of autonomy with respect to matters 
embraced by those Amendments.91  Applying this view to the facts at hand, Justice 
Rehnquist wrote “[w]e think that Congress may, in determining what is ‘appropriate 
legislation’ for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state officials which are 
constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.”92 
Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment but rejected the notion of a broad 
constitutionally based state sovereign immunity.  In Justice Brennan's view, the 
states, by ratifying the Constitution, had surrendered their immunity with respect to 
all of the enumerated powers granted to Congress.93  Justice Brennan believed 
Congress could have validly enacted the legislation under either its Commerce 
Clause or Fourteenth Amendment powers.94  In a separate concurring opinion, 
Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Brennan on this point, writing, “the commerce 
power is broad enough to . . . provide[] the necessary support for the 1972 
Amendments to Title VII.”95  This commerce power question was put squarely 
before the Court in the second key case, Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.96 
Union Gas was an appeal by the State of Pennsylvania of a federal court of 
appeals decision finding the state subject to a private suit97 brought pursuant to the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 
                                                                
87See id. at 450. 
88See id. 
89Id. at 448. 
90See id. at 456. 
91Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455. 
92Id. at 456. 
93See id. at 457-58 (Brennan, J. concurring). 
94See id.  The Commerce Clause provides that “Congress shall have power to . . . regulate 
commerce . . . among the several States.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.   
95Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 458 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
96491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
97See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 6. 
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(CERCLA).98  Congress enacted CERCLA and the subsequent Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)99 pursuant to its Commerce 
Clause powers to provide a mechanism to clean up hazardous waste sites.100  
In the district court, Pennsylvania argued that the private claim against it was 
barred by its Eleventh Amendment immunity.101  The Court of Appeals ultimately 
rejected this argument, holding that CERCLA, as amended by SARA, clearly 
expressed congressional intent to subject states to private suits for monetary damages 
and that Congress had the power to do so under the Commerce Clause.102  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed in a plurality decision which again 
revealed the two opposing views in the Court on the sovereign immunity debate. 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, in an 
opinion announcing the judgment of the Court set forth the “pro-congressional 
power” view.  He began by noting that, although the Court had never “squarely 
resolved” the question of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority vis-a-vis state 
immunity, the relevant precedent, including Fitzpatrick, supported a decision in 
favor of congressional power.103  The fundamental underpinning of Justice Brennan's 
argument was that, “in approving the commerce power, the States consented to suits 
against them based on congressionally created causes of action.”104  Justice Brennan 
stated: 
Because the Commerce Clause withholds power from the States at the 
same time as it confers it on Congress, and because the congressional 
power thus conferred would be incomplete without the authority to render 
States liable in damages, it must be that, to the extent that the States gave 
Congress the authority to regulate commerce, they also relinquished their 
immunity where Congress found it necessary, in exercising this authority, 
to render them liable.105 
Justice Brennan rejected the idea that Hans conflicted with or precluded this 
conclusion.  He noted that while Hans had indeed upheld a principle of sovereign 
immunity, it had not tested the question of whether that immunity was constitutional 
                                                                
9842 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994).  CERCLA provided for the hazardous waste “Superfund” 
program. 
99Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9613 
(1994). 
100See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 7.  The United States sued Union Gas Company under 
CERCLA to recover costs of an environmental cleanup (the country’s first “Superfund” site) 
and Union Gas filed a third party complaint against Pennsylvania, alleging that the State was 
at least partially liable for the costs.  See id. at 6. 
101See id. 
102See id. 
103See id. at 14-15.  Justice Brennan also cited Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama 
Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) and Employees v. Missouri Dept. of Public Health and 
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973). 
104Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 22. 
105Id. at 19-20. 
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in nature or whether, as federal common law, it was subject to abrogation by 
Congress.106  Expanding on this point in his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens 
wrote that, while the diversity jurisdiction immunity granted to the states by the 
literal text of the Eleventh Amendment, (the Amendment’s “legitimate scope”) is 
constitutional in nature and beyond congressional power, all subsequent extensions 
of the Eleventh Amendment via the Hans line of cases are nothing more than non-
constitutional judge-made law and subject to change by Congress.107   
Justice White concurred in the decision but wrote separately to express his view 
that CERCLA did not include a sufficiently clear statement of Congress’s intent to 
abrogate state immunity.108  However, conceding that this view had not prevailed, he 
voted to affirm stating, “I agree . . . that Congress has the authority under Article I to 
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states”.109 
The “pro-immunity” or federalism point of view was argued by Justice Scalia in 
his dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor and 
Justice Kennedy.  Justice Scalia rejected a straight textual interpretation of Article III 
and the Eleventh Amendment in favor of a recognition of certain background 
postulates which must be taken into account when interpreting the meaning of the 
Constitution.110  He argued that one such postulate was the principle of sovereign 
immunity and that, while the states had surrendered some aspects of this immunity in 
ratifying the Constitution, they had not surrendered immunity to suits by private 
individuals.111  Because, in Justice Scalia’s view, this retained immunity was a 
background assumption under which the Constitution was adopted, such immunity 
possessed a constitutional dimension and thus could not be abrogated by statute.112  
Justice Scalia argued that Hans served to validate his argument, stating:  
What we said in Hans was, essentially, that the Eleventh Amendment was 
important not merely for what it said but for what it reflected: a consensus 
that the doctrine of sovereign immunity . . . was part of the understood 
background against which the Constitution was adopted, and which its 
jurisdictional provisions did not mean to sweep away.113 
                                                                
106See id. at 18-19. 
107Id. at 23-24 (Stevens, J. concurring).  
It is important to emphasize the distinction between our two Eleventh Amendments.  
There is first the correct and literal interpretation of the plain language of the Eleventh 
Amendment . . .  In addition, there is the defense of sovereign immunity that the Court 
has added to the text of the Amendment in cases like Hans v. Louisiana. 
Id. at 23 (citation omitted). 
108See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 55-56 (White, J. concurring).   
109Id. at 57. 
110Id. at 32-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
111Id. 
112Id. at 33-34. 
113Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 31-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Thus, in Justice Scalia’s view, “state immunity from suit in federal courts is a 
structural component of federalism” which cannot be abridged by Congress pursuant 
to its Article I powers.114  
Justice Scalia distinguished Fitzpatrick on the grounds that the law in question in 
that case had been enacted pursuant to Congress's Fourteenth Amendment authority 
rather than its Article I powers.  Because the Fourteenth Amendment, unlike Article 
I, had been adopted subsequent to the Eleventh Amendment, Justice Scalia 
contended that, with respect to its provisions, it represented a surrender by the states 
of the background principle of sovereign immunity embodied by the Eleventh 
Amendment.115 
Seven years later, the Court reconsidered the Article I/Commerce Clause 
question in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.116  The two opposing views 
remained the same but the makeup of the Court had shifted in favor of the federalism 
position.117  Consequently, the Court overturned Union Gas118 and set out the rule 
that Congress, pursuant to its Article I powers, may not authorize private suits for 
money damages against unconsenting states in federal courts.119  The decision led 
one lower federal court to complain:  “It is unfortunately a tragic consequence of the 
Supreme Court's inability to maintain the status of its own precedents that all this 
time and effort has been wasted.  Compare Seminole Tribe (holding that Congress 
lacks power) with Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. . . . (upholding Congress's 
power).”120 
Writing for a majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by the other Union Gas 
dissenters Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy as well as Justice Thomas, 
defended this deviation from the general principle of stare decisis.  Initially, the 
majority characterized Union Gas as a “deeply fractured” plurality decision, noting 
that Justice Brennan’s Union Gas opinion had been joined by only three other 
justices and that Justice White, who had provided the decisive vote, had written a 
separate opinion “in order to indicate his disagreement with the plurality’s 
rationale.”121  Additionally, citing the lower court decision in Seminole Tribe itself 
                                                                
114Id. at 38. 
115Id. at 41-42. 
116517 U.S. 44 (1996).  The petitioners in Seminole Tribe had brought suit against the State 
of Florida in federal district court alleging violation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 
U.S.C. § 2701-21 (1994), which Congress had enacted pursuant to its (Indian) Commerce 
Clause powers.  Id. at 52-53. 
117In 1990, Justice Souter replaced Justice Brennan; in 1991, Justice Thomas replaced 
Justice White; in 1993, Justice Ginsburg replaced Justice Blackmun. 
118See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66. 
119Id. at 73. 
120Mills v. Maine, No. 92-410-P-H, 1996 WL 400510 (D.Me. 1996) (citations omitted). 
121Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 64.  It may not be accurate though, to imply that Justice 
White’s purpose in writing separately was to express his disagreement with Justice Brennan’s 
views on the Commerce Clause question.  While it is true that Justice White wrote separately 
in Union Gas, his opinion was devoted almost entirely to his argument that CERCLA as 
amended by SARA did not contain an unmistakable statement of congressional intent to 
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states.  Justice White devoted just two 
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along with one other case, the majority stated that Union Gas had “created confusion 
among the lower courts.”122  Finally, Justice Rehnquist complained that Union Gas 
had “deviated sharply from our established federalism jurisprudence and essentially 
eviscerated our decision in Hans.”123  This last point may be the most telling in that it 
highlights the incompatibility of Union Gas with the majority’s view of the Hans 
line of cases.  
While Seminole Tribe effectively cut off the federal courts as a forum for suits 
against unconsenting states by private individuals under Commerce Clause 
legislation, the case did not directly address the related question of Congress's power 
to authorize such suits in state courts.  This state court question had, however, been 
previously considered in Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Commission.124  
Hilton was a private suit against an arm of the State of South Carolina which 
operated a railroad engaged in interstate commerce as a common carrier.125  The 
petitioner, Kenneth Hilton, was an employee of the railroad who sought to recover, 
pursuant to the terms of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA),126 for alleged 
job related injuries.127  FELA provided that “[e]very common carrier while engaging 
in commerce . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is 
employed by such carrier in such commerce.”128  A similar FELA claim brought in 
federal court had been upheld against a state sovereign immunity defense in the 1964 
case of Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks Department.129  The 
Parden Court had held that, by referring to “every common carrier” in FELA, 
Congress had intended to create a cause of action against even state-owned 
railroads130 and further, that by operating a railroad in interstate commerce a state 
                                                          
sentences to the question of whether the Commerce Clause grants Congress this abrogation 
authority, stating: 
This brings me to the question whether Congress has the constitutional power to 
abrogate the States’ immunity.  In that respect, I agree with the conclusion reached by 
Justice Brennan . . . that Congress has the authority under Article I to abrogate the 
Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States, although I do not agree with much of 
his reasoning. 
Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 57 (White, J. concurring).  By the same token, Justice White’s 
statement does not necessarily support the conclusion that the Union Gas plurality opinion 
was “deeply fractured” because Justice White did not elaborate on the nature of his 
disagreement with Justice Brennan’s reasoning. 
122Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 64. 
123Id. 
124502 U.S. 197 (1991). 
125Id. at 199. 
12645 U.S.C. § 51 (1994). 
127Hilton, 502 U.S. at 199. 
128Id. at 201 n.1. 
129377 U.S. 184 (1964). 
130Id. at 190. 
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss3/6
2000] ALDEN v. MAINE AND STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 517 
implicitly consented to FELA suits and waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity 
defense.131 
Against the background of Parden, Hilton initially filed his suit in federal district 
court.  However, while Hilton’s suit was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court in Welch 
v. Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation,132 effectively held that 
FELA did not contain a statement of congressional intent to abrogate a state's 
Eleventh Amendment immunity which was sufficient to support the constructive 
waiver theory of Parden,133 and Parden was consequently overruled to the extent it 
was inconsistent with Welch.134 
In light of Welch, Hilton refiled his suit in South Carolina state court.  The state 
trial court dismissed the suit and the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed.135  The 
basis for the dismissal was not that the state had immunity, but that FELA did not 
create a cause of action against the state in state court.136  The South Carolina 
Supreme Court, relying on Welch’s holding that FELA did not contain language 
sufficiently clear to create a cause of action in federal courts, concluded that the 
statute likewise did not sufficiently evidence congressional intent to create a cause of 
action against the states in state court.137 
The issue before the United States Supreme Court in Hilton, then, was whether 
FELA “create[d] a cause of action against a state-owned railroad, enforceable in state 
court.”138  The Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court and held that the 
statute did create such a cause of action and ordered that Hilton's suit be allowed to 
proceed.139  The Court acknowledged the decision in Welch but stated that the 
“unmistakably clear language” test for determining whether Congress intended to 
abrogate state immunity in federal courts was not necessarily dispositive in 
                                                                
131See id. at 192. 
132483 U.S. 468 (1987) 
133See Welch, 483 U.S. at 472.  In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 
(1985), the Court held that, when acting pursuant to its authority under section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress could only abrogate state immunity in federal court “by 
making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.”  Id. at 242.  In applying 
this test to Welch, the Court assumed arguendo that Congress’s power to abrogate state 
immunity was not limited to the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Welch, 483 U.S. at 475.  
Because FELA did not pass the “unmistakably clear language” test, it was not necessary to 
resolve any additional constitutional question and the Court expressly refrained from deciding 
whether Congress had abrogation power pursuant to the Commerce Clause.  Id. at 478 n.8. 
134See Welch, 483 U.S. at 478. 
135Hilton, 502 U.S. at 200. 
136See Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Ry. Comm’n, 306 S.C. 260 (1990).  The South Carolina 
Supreme Court affirmed in a one paragraph opinion, citing its decision in the essentially 
identical case of Freeman v. S.C. Pub. Ry. Comm’n, 302 S.C. 51 (1990). 
137Freeman, 302 S.C. at 55. 
138Hilton, 502 U.S. at 199. 
139Id. at 207. 
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determining whether Congress intended to impose monetary liability on the states.140  
Thus, the Court noted that Welch had overruled Parden only with respect to its 
Eleventh Amendment (federal court) waiver theory but not with respect to Parden’s 
closely related holding that Congress intended to include state-owned railroads 
within FELA’s terms.141  The Court stated that, in recognition of stare decisis, it 
would not “reexamine this longstanding statutory construction.”142 
Although the direct question in Hilton was one of statutory construction, 
underlying the decision was the assumption that Congress can create a private cause 
of action for money damages, good against the states in state court, if it so intends.  
If this had not been the case, the discussion of congressional intent would have been 
superfluous.  The decision itself makes clear this underlying assumption.  After 
explaining that a “clear statement inquiry” was not required because Parden had 
already established that Congress, in enacting FELA, “intended to create a cause of 
action against the states,”143 the Court stated “when the rule [of a clear statement of 
congressional intent] is either overcome or inapplicable so that a federal statute does 
impose liability upon the States, the Supremacy Clause makes that statute the law in 
every State, fully enforceable in state court.”144 
Justice O'Connor, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Scalia, did not 
contend that states have immunity from federal question suits in their own courts.  
Rather, she argued that the “clear statement” test was applicable and had not been 
met.  Justice O’Connor wrote, “a federal statute requiring the States to entertain 
damages suits against themselves in state courts is precisely the kind of legislation 
that requires a clear statement, because of the long-established principle that a State 
cannot normally be sued in its own courts without its consent.”145  Justice 
O’Connor’s primary argument was that the decision in Welch, finding no 
“unmistakably clear” statement of congressional intent to abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, mandated a similar finding with respect to whether FELA 
created a valid private cause of action against a state in the state’s own courts.146  She 
rejected the idea that the two inquiries were not the same.147  Thus, the dissenting 
opinion also rested on the assumption that Congress does have the power to abrogate 
a state’s immunity in state courts if the “clear statement” standard is met.   
The meaning of Hilton with respect to other assertions of state immunity in state 
courts was evaluated differently by lower courts in subsequent cases.  In the 1998 
case of Jacoby v. Arkansas Department of Education, Vocational and Technical 
Education Division,148 the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld a private federal question 
                                                                
140Id. at 205-06 (differentiating between “application of a rule of constitutional law” and 
“an ordinary rule of statutory construction”). 
141Id. at 204-05. 
142Id. at 202. 
143Hilton, 502 U.S. at 200. 
144Id. at 207. 
145Id. at 208 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
146Id. 
147Id. at 208-09. 
148962 S.W.2d 773 (Ark. 1998). 
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suit against the State of Arkansas, holding that Hilton had established that states have 
no constitutional sovereign immunity superior to the Supremacy Clause.149  That 
same year, in an essentially identical case, Alden v. State,150 the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Maine reached a conflicting conclusion, ruling that state sovereign 
immunity did prevail in the state's own courts when the state is sued for violating a 
federal statute.151  The Maine court acknowledged Hilton, but held that, in the light of 
Seminole Tribe, Hilton was no longer dispositive of the question.152 
III.  THE DECISION 
A.  Facts and Procedural History 
Alden v. Maine,153 like Jacoby, its Arkansas counterpart, involved a claim against 
a state pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA).154  The FLSA was 
enacted by Congress pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers and imposes standards 
such as minimum wages and maximum hours on all covered employers.155  Prior to 
Alden and Seminole Tribe,156 the FLSA had been the subject of a series of Supreme 
Court cases testing the threshold question of whether application of the FLSA to the 
states was a valid exercise of the commerce power or whether implicit constitutional 
principles of state sovereignty served to make the states immune to federal 
Commerce Clause regulation when the states acted in performance of their 
governmental functions.  This question was broader than the question subsequently 
raised in Alden, of whether state sovereign immunity precludes congressional 
authorization of private suits for damages against the states as a means to enforce the 
FLSA. 
As originally enacted, the FLSA excluded the states from its requirements.  In 
1966 Congress amended the law to cover employees of hospitals, institutions and 
schools, including those operated by the states or their political subdivisions.157  In 
Maryland v. Wirtz, Maryland and twenty-seven other states challenged this 
expansion of the Act on grounds of state sovereignty.158  Specifically, the states 
argued that an otherwise valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power is 
unconstitutional when it interferes with the states in “the performance of 
governmental functions.”159  The Court specifically rejected the idea that the 
                                                                
149Id. at 775-76. 
150715 A.2d 172 (Me. 1998). 
151Id. at 175 (“[W]e conclude that sovereign immunity protects the State from defending 
this federal cause of action in its own courts.”). 
152Id. 
153527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
15429 U.S.C. § 201-19 (1994).  
155See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 186-87 (1968). 
156Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
157Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 185-87. 
158Id. at 187. 
159Id. at 195. 
17Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
520 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:503 
commerce power is inferior to state sovereignty when that power is used to regulate 
state governmental functions.160  Finding the FLSA to be a valid exercise of the 
commerce power, the Court upheld the 1966 amendments.161  
Eight years later, the Court reconsidered the question in National League of 
Cities v. Usery.162  National League of Cities was a challenge to 1974 amendments to 
the FLSA which had the effect of expanding the law to cover almost all state 
employees.163  As in Wirtz, the appellant States argued that the law transgressed 
recognized constitutional principles of state sovereignty.164  This time the Court sided 
with the states.  In an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, the Court overruled 
Wirtz165 and held that Congress may not, pursuant to its commerce power, directly 
regulate the states in areas involving traditional government functions.166  Contrary to 
Wirtz, the Court in National League of Cities concluded that the federal system of 
government set forth in the Constitution implicitly precluded such regulation.167  
Rather than settling the matter, the decision in National League of Cities led to a 
dispute between the federal government and the states, and disagreement in the lower 
courts, as to which state activities constituted traditional government functions and 
were thus immune from regulation under the Commerce Clause.  This question 
reached the Supreme Court in the 1985 case of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan 
Transit Authority.168  In Garcia, the Court overruled National League of Cities and 
rejected the “traditional government function” test as unworkable.169  The Court 
stated that any scheme which required characterization of state governmental 
functions as “traditional”, “integral” or “necessary” as a prerequisite for immunity 
from federal regulation would be incompatible with constitutional principles of 
federalism in that the ultimate immunity decision would inevitably be made by an 
unelected federal judge.170  In effect, the federal judiciary would be passing judgment 
on whether or not it favored a particular state policy.  The Court stated that a judicial 
role of this type “disserves principles of democratic self-governance”171 and 
explained further that the Constitution protected state sovereign interests by giving 
the states a role in the selection of the national government, not through “judicially 
created limitations on federal power.”172  Garcia then, by removing the commerce 
                                                                
160Id. 
161Id. at 188. 
162426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
163Id. at 836-37. 
164Id. at 841. 
165Id. at 855. 
166Id. at 852. 
167National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 851. 
168469 U.S. 528, 530-31 (1985). 
169Id. at 531. 
170Id. at 546. 
171Id. at 547. 
172Id. at 552. 
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power limitations established in National League of Cities, appeared to have cleared 
the way for private FLSA suits against the states.173  Little did the Garcia majority 
know that in doing so, the Court had helped to set the stage for Alden. 
The Alden litigation originated in federal district court as Mills v. Maine.174  That 
suit was filed in 1992 by probation officers employed by the State of Maine seeking 
overtime pay pursuant to the FLSA.175  In 1996, in the wake of Seminole Tribe, the 
district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, leading to that 
court's bitter complaint about the failure of the Supreme Court to follow its own 
precedent.176  The dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit.177  
Subsequently, John Alden and other probation officers filed the Mills complaint 
in Maine Superior Court in 1996.178  The Superior Court dismissed the suit on the 
basis of state sovereign immunity and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.179  
Because this decision conflicted with that of the Arkansas court in Jacoby, the 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to squarely address whether the 
states have an immunity to private suits in their own courts comparable to the federal 
court immunity set out in Seminole Tribe.180 
B.  The Decision 
Alden was argued before the Supreme Court in March of 1999, three years after 
Seminole Tribe was decided, and in many ways Alden parallels that earlier decision.  
As in Seminole Tribe, the Court favored the “federalism” position, and affirmed the 
decision of the Maine court to dismiss Alden's suit.  The Alden decision was carried 
by the same five to four majority which prevailed in Seminole Tribe181 and many of 
the arguments on both sides of the case had been employed or foreshadowed in 
Seminole Tribe, or earlier, in Union Gas.182   
1.  The Majority Opinion 
In an opinion delivered by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that Congress does 
not have the power under Article I of the Constitution to “subject nonconsenting 
                                                                
173The Garcia plaintiffs never prevailed on their claim though.  On remand the district 
court refused to apply the Supreme Court decision retroactively and the appellate court 
affirmed.  See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 838 F.2d 1411 (5th Cir. 1988). 
174Mills v. Maine, 839 F. Supp. 3 (D.Me. 1993); Mills v. Maine, 853 F. Supp. 551 (D.Me. 
1994); Mills v. State, 1996 WL 400510 (D.Me. 1996). 
175See Alden v. State, 715 A.2d 172, 173 (Me. 1998). 
176See supra text accompanying note 120. 
177See Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 1997). 
178See Alden, 715 A.2d at 173. 
179See id. 
180See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999). 
181See Alden, 527 U.S. at 710. 
182Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
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states to private suits for damages in state courts.”183  Although this holding was 
announced in terms of a limitation on Congress’s powers under Article I, it is 
perhaps more descriptive to characterize it as crystalizing a new unwritten state 
immunity element of the Constitution.184  Because the remedial provision of the 
FLSA on which the Alden petitioners relied conflicted with this unwritten element, 
that part of the FLSA was unconstitutional and struck down.  The decision expands 
the concept of the “underlying postulate” of state sovereign immunity from that of a 
federal court immunity anchored in the Eleventh Amendment as per Seminole Tribe, 
to a broader federal and state court immunity which is “confirmed” by the language 
of the Tenth Amendment and independent of the Eleventh Amendment.185 
The Court summarized its position and rationale for the decision by stating that 
immunity from private suit was a “fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the 
states enjoyed” prior to ratifying the Constitution and that this immunity continues 
“except as altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional 
amendments.”186  In the Court’s view, neither the powers granted to Congress by 
Article I, nor the Supremacy Clause, nor the jurisdictional grants of Article III 
constituted an effective alteration of this “fundamental aspect” of state sovereignty. 
The Court supported its position with two primary arguments.187  Initially, and 
most fundamentally, the Court contended that state sovereign immunity having the 
parameters established in Alden, was an “original understanding” upon which the 
Constitution was ratified.  To buttress this original intent argument, the Court 
advanced the structural argument that a Congressional power to abrogate this state 
immunity would be inconsistent with the system of divided state and federal 
authority set out by the Constitution.  Throughout its opinion, the Court also drew 
support from history and precedent, canvassing its prior immunity decisions 
beginning with Hans188 to find both a “settled doctrinal understanding” that state 
sovereign immunity is implicit in the Constitution189 as well as “theory and reasoning 
. . . suggest[ing]” that this immunity extends to state courts.190  These arguments are 
summarized in more detail in the following sections. 
a.  Original Intent 
According to the Court's historical analysis, at the time of ratification, the English 
Crown had enjoyed an unqualified immunity from suit,191 and, although Americans 
                                                                
183Alden, 527 U.S. at 712. 
184See, e.g., id. at 739-40 (“[T]he Constitution reserves to the States a constitutional 
immunity from private suits in their own courts which cannot be abrogated by Congress.”). 
185See id. at 712-14. 
186Id. at 713. 
187See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 (referring to the Constitution’s history and structure). 
188Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
189Alden, 527 U.S. at 728. 
190Id. at 745. 
191See id. at 715 (Quoting 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 234-
35, (1765). 
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“had rejected other aspects of English political theory,” this English concept of 
sovereignty had been universally adopted by the states.192  Reflecting this underlying 
assumption, the Court began its discussion of original intent by stating “[t]he 
generation that designed and adopted our federal system considered immunity from 
private suit central to sovereign dignity.”193  As evidence of this, the Court cited 
Alexander Hamilton’s statement in The Federalist No. 81 that the states would retain 
their sovereign immunity unless it was surrendered pursuant to plan of the 
convention, as well as the supporting statements of James Madison and John 
Marshall made at the Virginia ratifying convention.194  The Court drew further 
support from the fact that several states, prior to ratification, had proposed 
amendments or issued declarations designed to limit or eliminate any language in 
Article III which appeared to impinge on state immunity.195 
Of course, one significant event in the historical record which might directly 
contradict the idea that an unconditional state immunity was a fundamental view of 
the founding generation is the Chisholm196 decision.  Just five years after ratification, 
when directly presented with the question, four of the five Supreme Court justices 
concluded that the provisions of Article III describing federal court jurisdiction over 
the states, precluded any conflicting state immunity.197  Consequently, an essential 
component of the Court's rationale, both in Seminole Tribe and Alden, was that 
Chisholm was an incorrect decision and contrary to a true fundamental understanding 
of the founders.   
As in Hans a century earlier, the majority described the Chisolm decision as 
resulting from an overemphasis on the text of Article III, with insufficient weight 
given to “either the practice or the understanding that prevailed in the States at the 
time the Constitution was adopted.”198  In contrast, Justice Iredell’s Chisholm dissent, 
with its focus on then existing state practice, is cited throughout Alden as reflecting 
the true implicit constitutional design.199  Consistent with this idea, the Court stated 
that the Chisholm decision created “profound shock” in the nation and cited 
statements to this effect from both the Massachusetts and Georgia legislatures.200  As 
primary proof of its position, though, the Court pointed to the subsequent enactment 
of the Eleventh Amendment, noting the “swiftness and near unanimity with which 
. . . [it] was adopted.”201 
                                                                
192Id. 
193Id.  
194See id. at 716-18; see also, supra text accompanying notes 17-21. 
195See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text; Alden, 527 U.S. at 719 (referring to “the 
expressed understanding of the only state conventions to address the issue in explicit terms.”). 
196Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793). 
197See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text. 
198Alden, 527 U.S. at 721. 
199See, e.g., id. at 720. 
200Id. 
201Id. at 724. 
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In the Court's view, the Eleventh Amendment served not to create an immunity 
limited to diversity actions in federal courts but, rather, to restore the original 
constitutional design which implicitly included a broader “English” type of 
immunity good against any suit brought by an individual against a state.  The Court 
specifically rejected as unsupportable the idea that Chisholm was a correct 
interpretation of the Constitution and that the Eleventh Amendment therefore, 
constituted a change to the constitutional design.202 
Finally, as circumstantial support for its original intent argument, the Court 
looked at early congressional practice to provide contemporaneous evidence of the 
Constitution's meaning.  In this inquiry, the Court uncovered no instance in which an 
early Congress enacted a statute which would have subjected nonconsenting states to 
private actions in state courts.  From this fact, the Court inferred that early 
Congresses had assumed they did not have the power to authorize such suits.203 
b.  Structuralism 
Consistent with its original intent position, the Court argued that the 
constitutional system of divided state and federal authority is incompatible with a 
congressional power to subject states to private suits in their own courts.  In the 
Court’s view, congressional power to abrogate state sovereign immunity in this way 
would jeopardize the federal structure by tipping the balance of power too strongly in 
favor of the federal government. 
The Court noted that the Constitution reserves a “vital role” for the states in the 
“fundamental processes of governance.”204  This can be seen both in those textual 
provisions of the Constitution which expressly mention the states and assume their 
continued existence, and in the fact that the Constitution grants only limited powers 
to the federal government.205  Further, the Tenth Amendment confirms “the 
constitutional role of the states as sovereign entities.”206  These aspects of the 
constitutional design “reserve[] to . . . [the states] a substantial portion of the 
Nation’s primary sovereignty” and entitle[] them to “the dignity and essential 
attributes” of sovereignty.207  The states, therefore, exist as sovereign bodies, not 
“mere provinces or political corporations,” and when operating within their sphere of 
sovereignty, the states are supreme and independent of the federal government.208  On 
this foundation, the Court argued that granting Congress the power to subject the 
states to private suits in their own courts would create an unacceptable compromise 
of constitutional federalism. 
                                                                
202See Alden, 527 U.S. at 721-22. 
203See id. at 744. 
204Id. at 713. 
205See id. 
206Id.  The Tenth Amendment provides that “The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
207Alden, 527 U.S. at 714. 
208Id. at 715. 
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Initially, the Court described a direct threat to state sovereignty, noting that 
private suits could create unacceptable financial burdens on the states, thereby giving 
Congress a leverage over state governments which would not be consistent with the 
constitutional design.209  Ultimately, in the Court's view, such suits could effectively 
constitute a federal power to “comandeer the entire political machinery of the State 
against its will and at the behest of individuals.”210  Additionally, by blurring the line 
between federal and state authority, and by pitting state judiciaries against the states' 
political branches, a congressional power to subject states to private suits in their 
own courts would directly affect the political accountability of state governments 
which is central to our system of representative democracy.  On this point, the Court 
stated that private suits would place an “unwarranted strain on the States' ability to 
govern in accordance with the will of their citizens.”211 
As a second structural point, the Court noted that whereas the Articles of 
Confederation had provided for regulation of the states as political entities, the 
founders had deliberately rejected that system in favor of one in which the Congress, 
concurrently with the states, regulates the citizenry directly.212  Consequently, in the 
Court's view, even when the federal government is operating within its own sphere 
(i.e., within its constitutional powers), Congress may be precluded from acting 
directly upon or through the states.213 
This position served as the basis for the Court's rejection of the petitioners’ 
argument that the powers of Congress enumerated in Article I, together with the 
Supremacy Clause, evidenced a relinquishment by the states of any sovereign 
immunity they might have had with respect to suits brought under federal law.  The 
Court pointed out that while the Supremacy Clause makes federal acts the supreme 
law of the land, binding on judges in every state, the Clause only applies to laws 
made pursuant to the Constitution.214  Because the FLSA215 and similar laws would 
violate the implicit constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity, they can not 
be said to have been enacted pursuant to the Constitution and, so, are outside the 
aegis of the Supremacy Clause.216  The Court applied this same reasoning with 
                                                                
209See id. at 750. 
210Id. at 749. 
211Id. at 750-51. 
212See Alden, 527 U.S. at 714 (quoting J. MADISON, 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION of 1787 9 (1911)) (“In this the founders achieved a deliberate departure from the 
Articles of Confederation: Experience under the Articles had ‘exploded on all hands’the 
‘practicality of making laws, with coercive sanctions, for the States as political bodies.’”).  
213See id. (“[E]ven as to matters within the competence of the National Government, the 
constitutional design secures the founding generation’s rejection of ‘the concept of a central 
government that would act upon and through the States’”). 
214See id. at 731.  The Supremacy Clause provides that “[t]his Constitution, and the Laws 
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby.”  U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
21529 U.S.C. § 201-207 (1994). 
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respect to the Necessary and Proper Clause, essentially arguing that any law which 
violates state sovereign immunity is not a “proper” exercise of congressional 
power.217  
c.  Precedent 
Throughout its opinion, the Court drew on prior decisions in the Hans line of 
cases (“authoritative interpretations by this Court”218) to support its positions.219  
Although conceding that these earlier cases dealt directly only with immunity in 
federal courts, the majority argued that the logic of the decisions is equally 
applicable to litigation in state courts.220  Accordingly, the majority cited extensively 
to prior cases to establish that “[t]he theory and reasoning of our earlier cases suggest 
the states do retain a constitutional immunity in their own courts.”221  Despite its 
reliance on these precedents, the Court acknowledged that the rationales underlying 
prior immunity cases were not always consistent with respect to the state court 
question,222 and attempted to reconcile, dismiss or distinguish the various cases 
which appear to conflict with Alden.  Of these, the Court singled out Hilton v. South 
Carolina Public Railways Commission223 and Nevada v. Hall224 as meriting more 
than just a brief comment.225 
Nevada v. Hall dealt with the issue of whether one state can be sued in the courts 
of another state (rather than in its own courts) and, on the basis of that factual 
difference, the Court argued that language from the case was not relevant to the 
question presented in Alden.226  Hilton, on the other hand, did deal directly with the 
state court question presented in Alden and the Court acknowledged that the case 
                                                          
216See Alden, 527 U.S. at 732 (“The Constitution, by delegating to Congress the power to 
establish the supreme law of the land when acting within its enumerated powers, does not 
foreclose a State from asserting immunity to claims arising under federal law merely because 
that law derives . . . from the national power.”). 
217See id. at 732-33 (quoting Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997)).  The 
Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the power “to make all laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing [Article I] powers.”  U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
218Alden, 527 U.S. at 713. 
219See, e.g., id. at 727-28 (citing Hans, Seminole Tribe, Pennhurst State School and 
Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) and many others). 
220See Alden, 527 U.S. at 733. 
221Id. 745-46 (citing 13 cases in support of this proposition). 
222See id. at 735 (“There are isolated statements in some of our cases suggesting that the 
Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable in state courts.”). 
223502 U.S. 197 (1991); see supra text accompanying notes 124-47. 
224440 U.S. 410 (1979); see supra note 80. 
225See Alden, 527 U.S. at 736. 
226See id. at 739. (“The decision addressed neither Congress’s power to subject States to 
private suits nor the States’ immunity from suit in their own courts.”). 
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could be read to support the petitioners' position.227  However, the Court found 
several ways to distinguish Hilton,  first noting that because the respondent in Hilton 
had not advanced sovereign immunity as a defense, that issue had not been squarely 
presented.228  The Court also seemed to imply that the concept of waiver of immunity 
or consent to suit which had supported the Parden decision in the federal court 
context (prior to Welch), had in some way been a factor in the Hilton decision.229  
Finally, the Court characterized Hilton as having been simply a pragmatic decision to 
uphold stare decisis in light of the substantial reliance by states and workers on 
FELA.230 
The Court effectively tied together its “prior decisions” arguments by stating that 
it is “settled doctrine” (i.e., “settled” by Seminole Tribe) that the states possess a 
sovereign immunity in federal court which Congress can not abrogate under its 
Article I powers and, that its prior decisions imply that the states retain an equivalent 
immunity in their own courts.  Thus when considered together, these two ideas lead 
to the conclusion that states possess an immunity in their own courts which is 
superior to Congress’s Article I power.231 
d.  Conclusion 
In concluding its opinion the Court stressed the fact that state sovereign 
immunity to private suits would not render the states completely immune to federal 
regulation and noted several ways in which states could still be subject to judicial 
review of their compliance with federal law.232  States might, for example, voluntarily 
consent to private suits and their consent to suits brought by the federal government 
is implicit in the Constitution.233  Additionally, as per Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,234 the 
states’ sovereign immunity does not extend to private causes of action created by 
Congress under the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.235  Finally, 
the Court pointed out that sovereign immunity applies only to states and not to lesser 
entities such as municipal corporations, and that state officers, under the doctrine of 
Ex parte Young,236 could be subject to private suit as individuals.237 
                                                                
227See id. at 737.  (“There is language in Hilton which gives some support to the position 
of petitioners here”). 
228See id. 
229See id.  In distinguishing Hilton, the Court stated: “Furthermore, our decision in Parden 
was based on concepts of waiver and consent.  Although later decisions have undermined the 
basis of Parden’s reasoning . . . we have not questioned the general proposition that a State 
may waive its sovereign immunity and consent to suit.”  See Alden, 527 U.S. at 737. 
230See id. 
231See id. at 748. 
232See id. at 755. 
233See id. 
234427 U.S. 445 (1976).  See supra text accompanying notes 82-95. 
235See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756. 
236209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
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2.  The Dissenting Opinion 
In a dissenting opinion which was joined in by the other Seminole Tribe 
dissenters,238 Justice Souter rejected the Alden decision in its entirety.  The dissent 
contested each element of the Alden majority's position and concluded that the 
decision was indefensible and unrealistic.239 
a.  Original Intent 
Justice Souter devoted the bulk of his dissent to contesting the Court's original 
intent argument.  In this regard, he first considered the nature of the state sovereign 
immunity which was set forth in the majority’s opinion and then he examined 
whether there is any evidence that such a concept of immunity was so fundamental 
to the founding generation that it should be held to be implicit in the constitutional 
design.  
In relation to the first point, Justice Souter argued that despite the majority’s 
references to an English origin for the American concept of sovereign immunity of 
the states, the immunity established in Alden is not actually consistent with the 
principles on which the sovereignty of the English Crown was based.240  Specifically, 
drawing from Blackstone, Brackton and other authorities, he contended that English 
immunity was a common law concept under which “no feudal lord could be sued in 
his own court.”241  In England, Acts of Parliament declared the Crown imperial and 
there was no court above the King’s, thus no writ could run against him.242  This was 
the common law basis for the King's immunity.  On the other hand, the sovereign 
immunity of the states established in Alden, exists even beyond their own courts and 
is indefeasible by statute.  Thus, this type of sovereign immunity could not 
historically have been an incorporation or continuation of the traditional 
understanding in England. 
In light of this inconsistency with the English common law concept of sovereign 
immunity, Justice Souter examined the contours of the immunity established by the 
majority and concluded that what the Court had found to be implicit in the 
constitutional design was the “natural law” concept of sovereign immunity, under 
which immunity from private suits is seen as an inherent and absolute element of the 
sovereignty of the states.243  
                                                          
237See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756-57.  The Court’s final concluding point was a finding that 
the State of Maine had not waived its immunity or consented to Alden’s suit.  See id.  
238See id. at 760.  Justice Souter was joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer. 
239See id. at 761 (Souter, J. dissenting) (“On each point the Court has raised it is mistaken, 
and I respectfully dissent from its judgment.”). 
240See id. at 762-63. 
241Alden, 527 U.S. at 765 n.3 (Souter, J. dissenting) (quoting 3 W. Holdsworth, History of 
English Law 465 (3d ed. 1927)).  
242See id. (quoting 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 518 (2d. ed. 
1899)) (“[T]hat there happens to be . . . no court above his court is, we may say, an 
accident.”). 
243See Alden, 527 U.S. at 767 n.6 (Souter, J. dissenting).  In his Seminole Tribe dissent, 
Justice Souter elaborated on the two sovereign immunity doctrines:  
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Having defined the immunity in question, Justice Souter then posed what he saw 
as the fundamental question: whether it could be said that this natural law view of 
sovereign immunity was widely held in the pre-ratification era.244  He concluded that, 
rather than showing a prevailing acceptance of a well-defined immunity, the 
available evidence brought to light disagreement, uncertainty and ambiguity as to 
whether state sovereign immunity existed and if it did exist, what its contours 
were.245   
In arriving at that conclusion, Justice Souter first looked at early American 
history, noting that prior to independence, the American Colonies were not sovereign 
entities and that some colonial charters were held by corporations or entities which 
were subject to suit.246  Following independence, two states adopted as constitutions 
existing charters which provided for suit against the state,247 while other states 
appeared to have incorporated the common law immunity of England.248  Justice 
Souter summarized this historical information as indicating that “[a]round the time of 
the Constitutional Convention . . . there existed among the states some diversity of 
practice with respect to sovereign immunity,” but he found no evidence that any state 
had adopted the natural law type of immunity.249   
With respect to the Constitutional Convention itself and the ratification debates, 
Justice Souter agreed with the majority that the subject of the immunity of a state in 
its own courts was not specifically addressed.250  However, while the majority took 
this as evidence that such immunity was so well settled as to be beyond discussion,251 
Justice Souter’s view was that the silence on the issue simply indicated that the 
founders never specifically considered whether state courts might be forums for 
federal question suits against the states.252 
The issue of state sovereign immunity in the federal courts was discussed at the 
ratification debates though, and Justice Souter acknowledged the statements by 
Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall which indicate that state immunity in federal fora 
would be maintained under the Constitution.  However, he pointed out that other 
                                                          
The one rule [natural law] holds that the King or the Crown, as the font of law, is not 
bound by the law’s provisions; the other [common law] provides that the King or 
Crown, as the font of justice, is not subject to suit in its own courts . . . . The one rule 
limits the reach of substantive law; the other, the jurisdiction of the courts. 
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 103 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
244See Alden, 527 U.S. at 763. 
245See id. at 764 (“There is almost no evidence that the generation of the Framers thought 
sovereign immunity was fundamental in the sense of being unalterable.”). 
246See id. (Souter, J. dissenting). 
247See id. at 769.  The states were Connecticut and Rhode Island.  Id. 
248See Alden, 527 U.S. at 769-70. 
249Id. at 772. 
250See id. at 772-73 (Souter, J. dissenting). 
251See id. at 741-42. 
252See id. at 772 (Souter, J. dissenting).  “[T]he issue was not on the participants' minds 
because the nature of sovereignty was not always explicitly addressed.”  See Alden, 527 U.S. 
at 772 n.12. 
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notable debate participants such as Edmond Randolph, James Wilson, and General 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney expressed opposing views.253  Further, even those who 
argued that immunity would continue did not specifically address the nature of the 
immunity about which they were talking, i.e., whether the immunity would extend to 
federal questions and/or whether it would be defeasible by statute.254  Justice Souter 
noted that even Hamilton’s statement in The Federalist No. 81 (that immunity to suit 
is inherent in the nature of sovereignty) which seems to most directly support the 
natural law view, is not entirely unambiguous, pointing out that Hamilton's statement 
was a response to his own self-posed hypothetical question involving state contract 
law (rather than a federal question)255 and that Hamilton qualified his statement by 
allowing that there might be some surrender of this immunity in the constitutional 
design.256 
As a final point, Justice Souter considered the fact that some states, on ratifying 
the Constitution, had issued statements of their understanding of Article III or 
proposed amendments altering its terms.  While the majority interpreted this as 
evidencing a fundamental understanding of a sovereign immunity that Article III did 
not abrogate,257 Justice Souter viewed it as evidence that those states either believed 
that Article III as written did subject them to private suits, or at least considered the 
meaning of Article III to be uncertain.258 
Turning next to the Chisholm decision, Justice Souter argued that regardless of 
the subsequent adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, the significance of the 
Chisholm decision to Alden is that it demonstrates that at the time of ratification 
there was no general understanding “that a state’s sovereign immunity from suit in 
its own courts was an inherent [natural law], and not merely a common-law 
[defeasible by statute], advantage.”259  Justice Souter argued that while the five 
Chisholm opinions displayed a divergence of view on the question, none of them, not 
even that of Justice Iredell, espoused the “Hamiltonian” concept of an immutable, 
constitutional state sovereign immunity.260  “This dearth of support,” Justice Souter 
contended, seriously undercut the majority’s original understanding rationale.261 
Consistent with his interpretation of the Chisholm decision, Justice Souter 
rejected the majority’s position that the Eleventh Amendment serves to restore an 
original understanding of the Constitution which includes Alden-type state sovereign 
immunity.  Justice Souter contended that because there was no such prevailing 
                                                                
253See id. at 772-78.  (“[O]n this point, too, a variety of views emerged and the diversity of 
sovereign immunity conceptions displayed itself.”).  Id. at 773. 
254See, e.g., id. at 778 (Souter, J. dissenting).  (“[N]either of them [Madison nor Marshall] 
indicated adherence to any immunity conception outside the common law”). 
255See id. at 773 n.13. 
256See Alden, 527 U.S. at 773 n.13. 
257See id. at 718-19. 
258See id. at 780 n.20 and accompanying text (Souter, J. dissenting). 
259Id. at 790. 
260See id. at 781. 
261Alden, 527 U.S. at 789. 
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understanding at the time of ratification, that understanding could not have been re-
established by the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.262  He viewed the Eleventh 
Amendment as a fact-driven development in an evolving area of constitutional law 
which served only to settle the limited question of citizen-state diversity jurisdiction 
in federal court.263 
To leave no stone unturned, Justice Souter also assumed arguendo that the natural 
law theory of state sovereign immunity in state courts had in fact been the original 
understanding of the founders, and asked whether that would justify the majority's 
decision.264  He concluded that, even under that assumption, the decision would be 
unsupportable because the natural law theory of sovereign immunity, as it was 
known to the founders, was based on the proposition that a law can not be held 
against the authority that made it.265  In England, where the Crown was then 
considered the font of all law, the practical effect of the natural law theory would 
have been no different from that of England’s common law based immunity.266  
However, in the United States, the states were not the font of federal legislation.  
Consequently, if the founders had intended to adopt the natural law theory of 
sovereign immunity, it would not have implied an immunity from suits arising under 
federal law, even if the suits were brought in the states’ own courts.267 
Finally, addressing the Court's historical argument that early congresses had 
never enacted legislation which would have authorized private suits against states in 
state courts, Justice Souter was apparently willing to acknowledge the majority’s 
claim that there may have been no such federal statutes to prior to FELA.268  Rather 
than taking this as evidence that Congress lacks such power, Justice Souter explained 
the absence of such statutes as the necessary consequence of an earlier belief that 
Congress did not have the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the states 
on certain subjects.  Because Garcia had established that the States are subject to 
federal law, even when acting in pursuance of traditional government functions, the 
earlier record was not directly relevant in Justice Souter's view.269  
b.  Structuralism 
Justice Souter disputed both of the majority's principal structural arguments.  
First, he argued that while the system of federalism inherent in the Constitution 
makes the States sovereign within their own spheres, it does not make them 
                                                                
262See id. at 792-94 (Souter, J. dissenting). 
263See id. at 793-94. 
264Id. at 795-96. 
265See id. at 796. 
266See Alden, 527 U.S. at 765 n.4. 
267See id. at 798. 
268See id. at 804 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
269See id. at 804-07.  “[T]he dearth of prior private federal claims entertained against the 
states in state courts does not tell us anything, and reflects nothing but an earlier and less 
expansive application of the commerce power.”  Id. at 806. 
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sovereign with respect to the powers delegated to the federal government.270  
Consequently, he rejected the Court’s position that private suits are inconsistent with 
constitutional federalism because they might threaten political accountability or 
fiscal health within the states.  In Justice Souter’s view, if such a threat to a state 
were to arise, it would only be due to a state's contravention of the will of the entire 
nation in an area within the federal power.  In such a situation, any resulting strain on 
the state should be seen as the intended effect of the federal system.271  Similarly, 
Justice Souter dismissed the majority's contention that the states’ sovereign dignity 
must be protected, arguing that sovereign dignity was a concept which developed in 
the context of monarchies and, hence, is completely out of place with a republican 
state.272 
The dissent also contested the majority’s second structural point that because the 
Constitution grants power to the federal government to directly regulate the 
citizenry, it precludes federal regulation of the states.  Justice Souter argued that the 
problem with the Articles of Confederation, which necessitated the Constitutional 
Convention, was that the federal government had too little power to bind the states, 
not too much.273  The fact that the Constitution gave the federal government certain 
limited powers to circumvent the states and regulate the people directly does not 
mean that the federal government is precluded from any direct regulation of the 
states themselves.274  Indeed, Justice Souter pointed out that the applicability of the 
FLSA to the states had already been settled by Garcia.275 
c.  Precedent 
As might be expected, the dissent's reading of Supreme Court precedent is also at 
odds with that of the majority.  Justice Souter argued that, like Seminole Tribe, Alden 
is inconsistent with Garcia and serves to make the FLSA substantially 
unenforceable.276  Additionally, Justice Souter contended that the decision is 
inconsistent with Hilton, noting that the Court in Hilton did not even hint at any 
constitutional bar to the suit against South Carolina, and, further, that if such a bar 
had existed, the Court would not have had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the 
case.277  
As for Hans and the other cases in that line relied on by the majority, Justice 
Souter did not cover them directly, referring instead to his dissent in Seminole Tribe 
where he discussed the cases at length.278  In the Seminole Tribe dissent, Justice 
                                                                
270See Alden, 527 U.S. at 800 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The State of Maine is not sovereign 
with respect to the national objective of the FLSA.”). 
271See id. at 800-03. 
272See id. at 802-03. 
273See id. at 776 n.16. 
274See id. at 809 n.39. 
275See Alden, 527 U.S. at 808-09 (Justice Souter suggests that the Alden decision has 
vitiated Garcia).  See id. at 810. 
276See id. at 809-11. 
277See id. at 804 n.37. 
278See id. at 762. 
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Souter had argued that the purpose behind the Eleventh Amendment was to address 
the pressing concern of the states that federal jurisdiction over common law diversity 
suits would defeat their ability to repudiate Revolutionary War debts.279  In extending 
the specific diversity jurisdiction language of the Amendment to cover federal 
question suits as well, the Hans Court made a fundamental error which “destroyed 
the congruence of the judicial power under Article III with the substantive 
guarantees of the Constitution.”280   The error was continued and extended 
throughout the Hans line and, finally, in Seminole Tribe erroneously elevated from 
common law to constitutional status.281  Justice Souter offered evidence that the 
“great weight of scholarly commentary agree[d]” with this view.282 
Finally, Justice Souter noted that in recognizing a principle of sovereign 
immunity as in Alden, the Court had abandoned the traditional belief that “where 
there is a right, there must be a remedy.”283  He concluded by analogizing the Court's 
position on state sovereign immunity to the economic substantive due process 
doctrine of the Lochner era284 and predicted that the Seminole Tribe/Alden doctrine 
would be equally fleeting.285 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In Seminole Tribe,286 the question was the extent of Congress’s Commerce 
Clause powers, in relation to the question of federal jurisdiction.  On the one hand, 
Article III grants federal courts jurisdiction over states in certain private suits and, on 
the other hand, the Eleventh Amendment limits this jurisdiction.  In this context, the 
Court viewed the specific text of the Eleventh Amendment as being just one aspect 
of a broader principle of state sovereign immunity which is an unwritten part of the 
constitutional design.  Although it is this broader concept of immunity rather than the 
precise text of the Amendment which barred the suit against the state of Florida, the 
                                                                
279See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 112-13 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
280Id. at 119. 
281See id. at 124-27. 
282Id. at 110 n.8. 
283Alden, 527 U.S. at 811. 
284The Lochner era, named for Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), was 
characterized by a laissez faire judicial philosophy under which economic rights, such as 
freedom to contract, were held to be constitutionally protected liberty interests.  The era came 
to an end in the mid-1930s when the Court, under political pressure engendered by the great 
depression, began upholding state economic regulations.  See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS 
M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MARK V. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 829-35 (1996).   
285See Alden, 527 U.S. at 814. 
The resemblance of today’s state sovereign immunity to the Lochner era’s industrial 
due process is striking.  The Court began this century by imputing immutable 
constitutional status to a conception of economic self-reliance that was never true to 
industrial life and grew insistently fictional with the years, and the Court has chosen to 
close the century by conferring like status on a conception of state sovereign immunity 
that is true neither to history nor to the structure of the Constitution. 
Id. 
286Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
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decision was nevertheless expressly limited to federal courts and it can thus be 
properly seen as an extension of the Hans287 line of Eleventh Amendment cases. 
In Alden,288 though, federal jursidiction was not an issue.  Article III and the 
Eleventh Amendment were not actual points of contention and there was no express 
constitutional jurisdiction question.  The case constituted a more direct test of the 
extent of  Congress's Article I power in connection with the Supremacy Clause and 
implicit structural notions of federalism.  Article III and the Eleventh Amendment 
were implicated in the case only to the extent that they shed light on the true issue 
presented in Alden, which was whether there was in fact a fundamental 
understanding of state sovereign immunity held by the founding generation which 
should be held to be part of the constitutional design and, if so, what the nature of 
that understanding was and what the contours of the immunity should be.  
The Court noted both the similarity and difference between Alden and the Hans 
line of cases, at one point differentiating Alden state court immunity as a “separate 
and distinct structural principle . . . not directly related to the scope of the judicial 
power established by Article III,”289 but later aligning Alden with the prior cases by 
stating that the logic of the Hans line of cases can be extended to cover the question 
in Alden.290  In extending the original intent logic of Hans and Seminole Tribe to find 
a constitutional immunity unsupported by any actual textual provision of the 
Constitution (other than the broad language of the Tenth Amendment), Alden 
represents a clear demonstration of the power of originalism as a method of 
constitutional interpretation and provides an opportunity to examine originalism as 
applied. 
It is true that the Court also relied on structuralism and precedent to support its 
decision.  These arguments, though, can be seen as secondary to, and contingent 
upon, the original intent rationale.  For example, in rejecting the structural argument 
that the Supremacy Clause made the FLSA the supreme law of the land, the Court 
reasoned that the Act was unconstitutional, and thus outside the scope of the 
Supremacy Clause because it was inconsistent with the original understanding of the 
founders.291  Clearly the Court’s position here rests entirely upon the original intent 
argument.  With respect to precedent, the cases relied on by the Court amount to 
circumstantial support at best.  As the majority acknowledged, the question in Alden 
had never before been squarely presented.292  Original intent then, clearly serves as 
the primary theoretical underpinning for the decision. 
In his 1989 essay Originalism, the Lesser Evil,293 Justice Scalia set out both the 
purported advantages of originalism (as opposed to non-originalist “values” based 
theories of constitutional interpretation), as well as the methodology required to 
                                                                
287Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
288Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
289Alden, 527 U.S. at 730.  
290See id. at 733. 
291See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text. 
292Alden, 527 U.S. at 741 (“Whether Congress has authority under Article I to abrogate a 
State’s immunity from suit in its own courts is, then, a question of first impression”). 
293Antonin J. Scalia, Originalism, the Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). 
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properly apply originalism.  On the first point, Justice Scalia argued that if the 
Constitution were assumed to have no fixed and ascertainable meaning, but were 
instead, an “invitation to apply current societal values,” then the legislature, not the 
courts, would be the appropriate body to ascertain constitutional meaning.294  For this 
reason, non-originalism could be said to undermine the whole doctrine of judicial 
review first set forth in Marbury v. Madison,295 which rests on the idea that it is the 
duty of the courts to ascertain the meaning of the law.296 
To realize the advantages of originalism, however, the doctrine must be properly 
employed, and on this point Justice Scalia stated that the “greatest defect” of 
originalism is “the difficulty of applying it correctly.”297  It is this second concern, 
the proper application of originalism, that can be seen as the main point of contention 
between the majority and the dissent. 
In his essay, Justice Scalia noted that, in the case of constitutional interpretation, 
originalist doctrine requires consideration of an enormous body of evidence, such as 
the records of the state ratification debates, along with an assessment of the 
reliability of such evidence.298  Accordingly, the Alden Court did appear to consider a 
large body of material from the founding period and the majority clearly identified 
the specific evidence of original intent on which it relied.  This consisted of “the 
views expressed by Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall during the ratification debates, 
and by Justice Iredell in his dissenting opinion in Chisholm,”299 the positions of the 
“only state [ratification] conventions formally to address the matter,”300  and the 
“events leading to the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.”301  Additionally, the 
Court stated as historical fact that the states had adopted from England “the doctrine 
that a sovereign could not be sued without its consent” and that this doctrine was 
“universal in the States when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.”302 
While this evidence might seem convincing when first read, all of it is 
contradicted by the dissent, either through equally credible but conflicting 
interpretations or by presentation of the dissent's own equally credible but conflicting 
evidence.303 Clearly the two positions can not be reconciled.  However, Justice 
Scalia's essay offers some further guidelines which help in evaluating the opinions 
under originalism principles.  Justice Scalia stated that proper application of 
originalism requires “immersing oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere 
of the time,” factoring out information not known in the earlier period, and adopting 
the “beliefs, attitudes, philosophies, predjudices and loyalties” of the time in 
                                                                
294Id. at 854. 
2955 U.S. 137 (1803). 
296See Scalia, supra note 293, at 854. 
297Scalia, supra note 293, at 856. 
298See id. at 856. 
299Alden, 527 U.S. at 727. 
300Id. at 726 (referring to New York, Virginia, Rhode Island and North Carolina).   
301Id. 
302Id. at 715-16. 
303See supra text accompanying notes 238-85. 
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question.304  In at least two areas, the thinking behind this admonition seems to favor 
the dissent rather than the majority opinion.  
First, with respect to the ratification debates, both the majority and the dissent 
agreed that whatever was said about state sovereign immunity was said in the context 
of the then pressing issue of potential suits to enforce Revolutionary War debt 
repayment.305  The majority presented no evidence that any of their cited speakers 
had considered, or intended to take a position on, immunity when federal regulation 
based on the Commerce Clause was at issue.  The same point can be made with 
respect to the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment.  While it is beyond doubt that 
the Amendment was intended to eliminate citizen-state diversity jurisdiction in 
federal court and the debt enforcement such jurisdiction threatened, it is something 
else again to read into that intent a generally held awareness or concern that some 
day federal laws enacted by Congress under the Commerce Clause might directly 
regulate the states, and an understanding that the states were to be inherently immune 
from any private suits that might result.  By taking statements and actions out of their 
actual ratification era context and applying them to today’s questions, the Court 
seems to be violating Justice Scalia’s originalism guideline. 
The second area where Justice Scalia’s rule is useful is in considering the 
majority's contention that the original states uniformly adopted from English 
precedent a sovereign immunity which was indefeasible, good in both state and 
federal courts and on both state and federal questions.  The majority supports this 
position with statements from Hans, Justice Iredell’s Chisholm dissent, Hamilton’s 
comments in The Federalist No. 81, and Blackstone's description of the sovereignty 
of the English Crown.306  However, none of these statements are truly “on point” and 
must be read in the light of subsequent events, such as Commerce Clause legislation 
to provide support for the majority’s position.  
Justice Souter, in contrast, appears to be more diligent in following Justice 
Scalia’s admonition to take into account the attitudes and beliefs of the time.  He 
noted that prior to independence, the American Colonies had no sovereignty of their 
own,307 and that, following independence, the Constitution set out an unprecedented 
system of government which split “the atom of sovereignty.”308  Consequently, even 
assuming that the original states had adopted an English concept of sovereign 
immunity, there would have been no existing tradition or understanding as to how 
that immunity would fit into the American federal system or what the limits of the 
immunity would be.  Against this background, Justice Souter presented evidence 
which tends to paint a picture of disagreement or uncertainty among the founders 
regarding the nature or extent of sovereign immunity rather than a well-defined and 
                                                                
304Scalia, supra note 293 at 856-57. 
305Compare Alden, 527 U.S. at 715-20 and id. at 772-73 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
306See id. at 715-17. 
307See id. at 764 (Souter, J. dissenting).  
308Id. at 799-800 (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
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widely held understanding.309  Additionally, Justice Souter noted that no state had 
declared in its constitution that sovereign immunity was an inalienable or natural 
right.310 
Another of Justice Scalia's comments is telling here.  After noting the difficulty 
of throwing off present-day prejudices and of taking on the attitudes of an earlier 
time, he stated that the proper application of originalism is “a task sometimes better 
suited to the historian than the lawyer.”311  The Court only partially heeded this 
advice.  For example, the majority cited to the works of legal historian David Currie 
four times for support of its original intent arguments,312 but ignored his disclaimer 
that “[t]his is not to say the [Chisholm] decision was necessarily wrong.  Madison, 
Marshall and Hamilton notwithstanding, there was no unanimity among the Framers 
that immunity would exist.”313 
Even if these first three originalism guidelines (consider the entire historical 
record, take on attitudes of the period in question, and heed the historians) do not 
provide sufficient criteria to evaluate Alden as an application of originalism, Justice 
Scalia provides one other guideline which is directly relevant.  He noted that one 
way to identify a pseudo-originalist opinion is to find that it “ignor[es] strong 
evidence of original intent that contradict[s] the minimal recited evidence of an 
original intent congenial to the court’s desires.”314  While it may not be fair to 
describe the majority's evidence as minimal, the amount of contradictory evidence 
that is ignored or dismissed is so large as to fairly raise the question whether the 
Court was, in fact, looking for an original intent congenial to its desires.  
For example, while relying on Hamilton, Madison and Marshall, the majority 
dismissed the views of Randolph, Wilson, and Pinckney as “scanty and equivocal 
evidence.”315  The pre-Chisholm decision of Maryland to submit to process in Van 
Stophorst v. Maryland316 and a similar decision by New York are dismissed as not 
“reflect[ive] of a widespread understanding.”317  The early proposals by Virginia and 
North Carolina to eliminate the citizen-state diversity jurisdiction language in Article 
III are characterized as reflecting only a generalized dissatisfaction with federal 
jurisdiction rather than a belief that Article III, as written, negated state immunity.318  
The fact that the original constitutions of Connecticut and Rhode Island provided for 
                                                                
309See supra text accompanying notes 237-83; see also, Alden, 527 U.S. at 761 (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“There is no evidence . . . that any concept of inherent sovereign immunity was 
understood historically to apply when the sovereign sued was not the font of the law.”). 
310See Alden, 527 U.S. at 772 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
311Scalia, supra note 293, at 857. 
312See Alden, 527 U.S. at 720-24. 
313DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT 19 (1985).  Justice Souter 
noted this omission in his dissent.  See Alden, 527 U.S. at 793 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
314Scalia, supra note 293, at 852. 
315Alden, 527 U.S. at 726. 
316Van Stophorst v. Maryland, 2 U.S. 401 (1791); see supra n.31. 
317See Alden, 527 U.S. at 726. 
318See id. at 725. 
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suits against these states is said to confirm a uniform view of state sovereign 
immunity rather than indicate some diversity of view on the subject.319  
Of even greater significance, the Chisholm decision itself is written off as an 
overly literal misinterpretation of the Constitution.320  In Chisholm, five prominent 
members of the founding generation directly addressed the question and none of 
them, not even Justice Iredell, stated a belief that the states have a constitutional 
sovereign immunity.321  This would seem to be strong evidence that the founders had 
no fundamental understanding to the contrary.  The Alden majority dismissed 
Chisholm, though, on the grounds that the Chisholm Justices, other than Justice 
Iredell, had failed to address the prevailing understanding in making their decision.322  
Not only might this be seen as specious reasoning (i.e., the decision was not a 
reflection of the original understanding because it failed to take into account the true 
original understanding), but, beyond that, it simply is hard to believe that the five 
Chisholm Justices would have failed to recognize or credit a truly fundamental 
understanding on the matter.  Chief Justice Jay, for example, had been a co-author 
with Alexander Hamilton of The Federalist.  He surely would have known, better 
than the Hans court of one hundred years later, exactly what Hamilton’s views were 
and whether those views were so pervasively held as to be implicit in the 
Constitution when it was ratified.  
The majority, of course, pointed to the subsequent adoption of the Eleventh 
Amendment as proving its argument that the Chisholm Court had failed to account 
for a fundamental postulate of Alden-type immunity implicit in the constitutional 
design.  In doing so,  however, the Court, as in Hans, was forced to dismiss 
contradictory evidence yet again, that evidence being the plain language of the 
Amendment itself, which addresses the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts, not a 
grander concept of immunity.  
This conflict between the Hans/Seminole Tribe/Alden view of sovereign immu-
nity and the language of the Constitution is not limited to a clash with the Eleventh 
Amendment though.  The plain text of Article III, as well as the Supremacy Clause, 
must be likewise supplemented, adjusted or dismissed to conform to the view of 
original understanding set forth in Alden.  Like the Chisholm decision, the text of the 
Constitution appears to present evidence, too strong to ignore, that there was no fixed 
idea of absolute state sovereign immunity to private suits which was taken for 
granted during the ratification era.323 
In response to this conflict with the constitutional text, the Court, throughout its 
opinion, warned that, in determining what the founders meant, you can not always 
rely on what they said.  With respect to the Eleventh Amendment and Article III, the 
                                                                
319See id. at 724-25. 
320See id at 721-24. 
321See supra text accompanying notes 33-45. 
322See Alden, 527 U.S. at 720. 
323Justice Souter made this same point in his Seminole Tribe dissent when in response to 
the majority’s charge that his textual analysis of the Eleventh Amendment was directed at a 
“straw man” he quipped “plain text is the Man of Steel in a confrontation with ‘background 
principles’ and ‘postulates which limit and control’” Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 444 at 1152 
n.13 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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Court rejected reliance on the “mere letter”324 or “bare text”325 of the law, the “mere 
literal application” of the law,326 the “ahistorical literalism” of resting on the words 
alone,327 and “blind reliance upon the text.”328  While this kind of wholesale 
disparagement of textualism might be expected in an opinion based on what Justice 
Scalia refers to as nonoriginalism,329 it does not seem consistent with the underlying 
principle of originalism that the Constitution is “an enactment that has a fixed 
meaning . . . ascertainable to those learned in the law.”330  In the context of Alden, 
this continual denigration of the constitutional text  has the effect of emphasizing the 
underlying problem - which is that if the majority’s view is correct, we must assume 
that the founders chose to express a fundamental understanding in language virtually 
certain to create conflicting interpretations.331 
Of course, all the conflicting evidence notwithstanding, it might still be 
hypothesized that the Alden majority did in fact capture a true fundamental 
understanding of the founding generation in their decision.  Even according this 
possibility a presumption of validity, though, the strong dissent of Justice Souter and 
the apparent discrepancies between the majority's reasoning and the tenets of 
originalism expounded by Justice Scalia, make it fair to consider whether there might 
actually be a different explanation for the decision.   In his essay, Justice Scalia 
addressed such a possibility, noting that “the main danger in judicial interpretation of 
the Constitution . . . is that the judges will mistake their own predilections for the 
law.”332  This thought is consistent with Justice Scalia’s earlier warning that 
originalism can be misused to support a decision designed to set forth “an original 
intent congenial to the court’s desires.”333  Both comments may well shed some light 
on Alden, in that the Court's recent federalism decisions appear to show a definite 
predilection for limiting federal power and expanding “states’ rights.” 
In 1985, the Court decided Garcia which held that Congress could regulate the 
states as states under its Commerce Clause power (barring some defect in the 
national legislative process).  The Court reasoned that the sovereignty of the states 
                                                                
324Alden, 527 U.S. at 727. 
325Id. at 736. 
326Id. at 729. 
327Id. at 730. 
328Id. 
329Scalia, supra note 293, at 855. 
330Id. at 854. 
331Discussing the text of Article III in his Chisholm concurrance, Justice Wilson opined 
that even a “great master” of the “strictest legal language” would  have been unable to more 
precisely or accurately provide for a diversity suit by a citizen against a state.  Chisholm, 2 
U.S. at 466 (Wilson, J., concurring). 
332Scalia, supra note 293, at 863.  Expanding on this concept Justice Scalia warned, “It is 
very difficult for a person to discern a difference between those political values that he 
personally thinks most important, and those political values that are ‘fundamental to our 
society.’”  Id. 
333See Scalia, supra note 293, at 852. 
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was properly protected by the prominent role in the national political process 
accorded them by the Constitution, not through discrete limitations on congressional 
power created by the judiciary.  As the make-up of the Court began to change in the 
1990s, however, that philosophy gave way to one which favored judicial 
involvement so as to further direct limitations on Congress.  This trend can be seen 
in cases throughout the last decade. 
In the 1992 case of New York v. United States,334 the Court held that the Low 
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985,335 requiring States to 
either regulate disposal of radioactive waste produced in the state in accordance with 
federal guidelines or take title to the waste, exceeded the limits of congressional 
power under the Commerce Clause.336  The Court found that the Act, through 
coercion, effectively commandeered the state governments into federal regulatory 
service in a way which was inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment and state 
sovereignty.337  Five years later, similar reasoning was extended to cover individual 
state officers in Printz v. United States.338  The Printz Court held that provisions of 
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act,339 requiring local law enforcement 
officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers in 
accordance with the federal statute’s mandate, constituted an unconstitutional 
attempt to conscript state officers into service as federal regulatory agents.340  The 
Court in Printz stated that such conscription was “fundamentally incompatible with 
our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.”341  
In the 1995 case of United States v. Lopez,342 the Court struck down the Gun Free 
School Zones Act of 1990, which made firearm possession in a school zone a federal 
offense, on the ground that such a prohibition was not sufficiently related to 
interstate commerce as to be valid legislation under the Commerce Clause.  The 
Court reasoned that any link between school zone gun possession and interstate 
commerce was so attenuated that the Act could not be considered a rational 
commerce regulation measure.343  Additionally, the Court warned of the danger of 
allowing the Commerce Clause become the basis for a general federal police power 
equivalent to the police power enjoyed by the states.344  The following year, Seminole 
Tribe constitutionalized state sovereign immunity from private suits for damages in 
                                                                
334505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
33542 U.S.C. § 2021(b)-(j) (1994). 
336See New York, 505 U.S. at 149. 
337See id. at 175-76. 
338521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
33918 U.S.C. §§ 921-30 (1994 & Supp. 1999). 
340See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. 
341Id. 
342514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
343See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
344See id. 
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federal courts.345  Alden followed in June, 1999 and the Court’s trend can be seen in 
other recent immunity cases. 
In College Savings Bank  v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense 
Board,346 decided the same day as Alden, the Court held that Trademark Remedy 
Clarification Act (TCRA), which amended the Trademark Act of 1946 to authorize 
private suits against the states, was ineffective against state sovereign immunity.347  
College Savings Bank argued that Congress enacted the TCRA pursuant to its 
powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus, as per Fitzpatrick v. 
Bitzer,348 state sovereign immunity should not serve to bar its TCRA based suit.349  
The Court, however, found that the TCRA could not be seen as enforcing any 
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment,350 rather, being just an exercise of Article I 
power, the TCRA was not effective to abrogate state sovereign immunity (as per 
Seminole Tribe).351  Additionally, the Court held that the State of Florida had not 
effectively waived its sovereign immunity.  In making this latter ruling, the Court 
expressly overruled Parden352 to the extent it had survived Welch,353 and fully 
repudiated the constructive waiver principle on which Parden was based.354  
In the case of Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. 
College Savings Bank,355 the Court held that the Patent and Plant Varieties Protection 
Remedy Clarification Act (Patent Remedy Act) which authorized private suits 
against states to remedy patent law violations could not “be sustained as legislation 
enacted to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.”356  Consequently, the private suits authorized by the Act were barred by 
state sovereign immunity. 
                                                                
345See supra notes 116-123 and accompanying text. 
346527 U.S. 666 (1999). 
347See id at 690.   
348427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
349See College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 673. 
350See id. at 674.  College Savings Bank (College) created and marketed a tuition savings 
plan.  The State of Florida subsequently offered a similar plan and College filed suit claiming 
it was injured by misrepresentations which Florida made about its own (Florida’s) plan in 
violation of the TCRA.  The Court held that any injury of College arising from such false 
advertising did not constitute a deprivation of a protected property interest within the meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See id. 
351See id. at 673. 
352Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Ala. State Docks Dep’t, 377 U.S. 184 (1964). 
353Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987). 
354See College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 683. 
355527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
356Id. at 630.  In this suit, College Savings Bank alleged violations of its patent by the 
State of Florida in violation of the Patent Remedy Act.  Because Congress had not identified a 
pattern of such violations by states prior to enacting the Patent Remedy Act, the Court held 
that the Act was not a valid remedial or preventative measure for purposes of section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  See id. at 647. 
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Most recently in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,357 the Court held that the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), while valid legislation 
under the Commerce Clause,358 was “not a valid exercise of Congress’s power under 
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”359  Consequently, as with the TCRA and 
the Patent Remedy Act, the provisions of the ADEA which authorized private suits 
against States were held to be unconstitutional violations of state sovereign 
immunity.360  With the exception of New York v. United States, all of these cases 
were decided by the same five-to-four majority that operated in Alden. 
In the last eight years, then, Union Gas has been overturned, Hilton has been 
effectively overturned, Garcia has been substantially undermined, the constructive 
waiver theory of Parden has been overruled, the “substantial effects” test for 
economic regulation under the Commerce Clause has been made more stringent 
(Lopez), and congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment has been 
repeatedly constrained.  This record indicates a break with prior federalism decisions 
and marks a more activist course which corresponds to the establishment of the 
present political make-up of the Court's membership.  Regardless of whether Alden is 
considered to be substantively good or bad for the country, when viewed in light of 
all the circumstances, the decision can be most realistically explained as a further 
step along the Court's current political path rather than as a true determination of 
some fundamental understanding of two hundred years ago.361  
V.  CONCLUSION 
The record of the major federalism cases of the last decade reveals a sharp 
ideological split within the Court on the nature and extent of state sovereign 
immunity as well as the broader question of the role of the judiciary in protecting or 
defining state sovereignty itself.  As long as the present “federalist” majority is 
maintained or increased, the course established in the 1990s is likely to continue.  If 
the make-up of the Court shifts in favor of the present dissenters, however, Seminole 
Tribe362 and Alden363 are unlikely to survive.  In a strong dissenting opinion in Kimel 
v. Florida Board of Regents,364 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, 
and Breyer, made it clear that he rejects Seminole Tribe as valid controlling 
precedent.365  
                                                                
357Id. at 631 (1999). 
358Id. at 643. 
359Welch, 527 U.S. at 650. 
360Id. 
361As Justice Souter pointed out, the rationale behind Alden was broad enough to 
encompass Seminole Tribe without any need for reliance on the Eleventh Amendment.  The 
fact that Seminole Tribe was decided first without mention of the broader Alden Tenth 
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362Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
363Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
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Even if Alden and Seminole Tribe do survive the current membership of the 
Court, the lack of textual support for state sovereign immunity as a constitutional 
principle and the flexibility of the original intent doctrine as it was applied in Alden, 
will continue to make the decisions subject to reversal. 
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